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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
Directorate of Intelligence 
23 April 1968 
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 
Czechoslovakia in Transition 
Sununary 
Alexander Dubcek's beliefs that domestic repres-
sion must cease and that the time has come for Czecho-
slovakia to take its place in the family of nations 
have led to a bloodless but nevertheless very real 
revolution in Czechoslovakia. The u~bending and un-
imaginative leadership of Antonin Novotny has been 
supplanted by a new administration dedicated to pol-
icies based on Dubcek's ideas. These include pro-
tection of the rights of the individual, the rule of 
law, a foreign policy serving the genuine interests 
of the country, and broad economic reforms. The 
party has promised to institutionalize such changes 
at a measured pace. 
Dubcek still is faced with significant domes-
tic opposition as distinct conservative and progres-
sive factions have now emerged in the party. There 
is no reason to believe that he will, or safely 
could, renege on his promises for changes, though 
he probably will find it difficult in some instances 
to move ahead as directly and rapidly as he might 
desire. 
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. 
It was prepared by the Off ice of current Intell~­
gence and coordinated with the Office of Economic 









The leaders of the Soviet Union appear to have 
conceded, though grudgingly, the Czechoslovak party's 
right to reform itself and to attempt a Communist 
"democratization." Brezhnev and Kosygin and the 
leaders of the Eastern European states nevertheless 
obviously fear the spread of such concepts to their 
own countries. The only limits placed on the new 
Czechoslovak regime by Moscow, however, are insist-
ence that the Communist Party retain primacy, and 
that Czechoslovakia honor its commitments to the USSR, 
the other Communist states, and the international 
Communist movement. Dubcek has agreed, but the man-
ner in which he and the Russians interpret these 
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The Bloodless Revolution 
l. After four years as the permissive ruler 
of Sloyakia, ·oubcek probably was not surprised by 
~he rapidity with which his views gained acceptance 
in the · party and among the politically active seg-
ments of the population. He used this groundswell 
of support first to sweep Novotny out of the 
party's top post and later from his position as 
president. Without previous preparation, and 
within months, . Dubcek seems to have gained effec-
tive control of the leadership of the party and 
government. Novotny and his closest adherents, 
shorn of their authoriity, are no longer in a posi-
tion to interfere with policymaking, but still, 
through their lower level supporters, can probably 
cause delays and interfere with the implementation 
of new policies. 
2. Dubcek's position is thus not yet secure. 
He has strengthened his hold by installing a 
majority of reformers in the reconstituted party 
presidium and a balanced new party secretariat to 
execute policy. He has pensioned off the most 
flagrant Stalinists, retired with honor older 
conservatives who helped bring him to power, and 
given the younger of them a chance to change or be 
swept out. Dubcek announced on 16 April that in 
the parceling out of responsibilities in the new 
party leadership he would retain supervision of 
party organizational and · personnel matters as well 
as security and defense. He is thus in a position 
to moderate the quarrels of unsatisfied progressives 
and scandalized conservatives in the leadership, 
without worrying that they could suddenly turn him 
out. 
The Organization 
3. The new Czechoslovak cabinet is composed 
mainly of technocrats, rather than ideologues .. rt 
accurately reflects the political state of affairs 
in Czechoslovakia, and is composed of ministers 
ranging from former conservatives to ultraliberals. 
The new premier, Oldrich Cernik, fought hard for 
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Novotny's ouster, but his appointment has come 
under attack because he was Novotny's economic 
planner and shares the blame for the sorry state 
of Czechoslovakia's economy. The performances of 
men such as Cernik will be carefully monitored by 
a reinvigorated National Assembly, led by the de-
·;:ermined liberal, Josef Smrkovsky, whose contested 
election gives a clear measure of the residual 
strength of the conservatives. Srnrkovsky received 
the votes of 18 8 deputies, with 6 8 opposing·, and 
44 abstaining or absenting themselves. 
4. Dubcek's party .. and .government appointments 
are designed to appeal to the broadest possible 
range of the party membership and of the population, 
and for the first time on any significant scale in 
20 years are also intended to strengthen representa-
tion of particular interest groups such as farmers, 
intellectuals, and the national minorities. On the 
whole, the n~w leadership is younger than its pre-
decessor, better educated, and steeled in the art 
of survival--especially those jailed during the 
Stalinist era, who in particular are determined 
that such days of terror will not return. 
5. Dubcek and the reformers have made many 
promises, some of which have already been effected. 
The first of these, to prevent a future concentra-
tion of power in one man's hands such as Novotny 
had, has been achieved through the series of new 
appointments to key government and party posit~ons. 
Only Premier Cernik has a seat both in the cabinet 
and the party presidium, presumably in a liaison 
capacity. The posts formerly held by Novotny--
party first secretary, presidium member, president, 
and chief of the National Front (formerly the 
party "transmission belt" to .the population) --are 
held individually by new appointees. 
The Party's New Program 
6. Despite inadequate time for thorough pre-
paration and a bitter behind-the-scenes struggle 
waged by the conservatives, Dubcek has ~ollowed 
through on another promise by promulgating a party 
No Use Only 
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"action program" that frankly acknowledges many 
past wrongs and is the guideline for one of the 
m~st liberal reforms ever considered by a Commu-
nist government. In the words of one of the pro-
gram's foremost exponents, it is an attempt to 
"synthesize" democracy and Communism. Compromises 
in the original draft apparently were necessary 
to gain conservative approval of the document. 
They primarily consist of a slowdown in the rate 
?f introducing economic reforms, and some changes 
in the tone of the document to give more stress 
to the primacy of the Communist Party and to 
Czechoslovakia's obligations to its Communist 
allies. Such generalities, however, are contra-
dicted in the program's promises to share at least 
some power with non-Communists and to insist that 
national interest take its place as an equal of 
Conununist "solidarity" as a criterion of foreign 
policy de~isions. 
7. The action program is an unabashed at-
tempt to effect a reconciliation between the rul-
ing Communists and the alienated population. Its 
recorrunendations for institutional changes will 
probably be acted upon favorably by the National 
Assembly and by government ministries because the 
Communist Party still is in control and in this 
case the party's desires coincide with those of the 
populace. The program provides for .. guarantees of 
personal rights, including freedom of speech, as-
sembly, association, religion, travel and work· 
abroad. "Certain specialists" are exempted from 
provisions allowing emigration. The program calls 
for an independent court system free of "political 
influences," and promises e+ectoral reforms. It 
establishes machinery both in the party and the 
government to rectify the injustices done to an 
estimated 40,000 victims of past political in-
justice, not only wiping their slates clean but 
providing compensation to those still alive. 
8. The civil police will be brought under 
control of the local governments, and presumably 
will have exclusive jurisdiction over domestic 
police matters. The secret police will concentrate 
No Dissem 




tl_leir effor~s on counterintelligence against for-
eign. c~untries. The secret police are expressly 
prohibited from interfering in politics. 
9. One of the most significant reforms re-
commended by the action prog:.am is a call for pre-
paration of a new constitution, a document that 
should result in a federal system of government 
which will give to Slovakia its long-sought auto-
nomy. Since the program's publication, important 
voices in Moravia have demanded that this region 
of the country also be given autonomous government. 
In the end, the proposed Czech-Slovak federation 
may in fact become a federal republic consisting 
of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, with Prague's 
national powers limited to foreign policy, macro-
economic controls, security, and national defense. 
I 
10. Even before the action program was 
a~opted, the Dubcek regime made several ·sharp 
breaks with the past. Dissident intellectuals who 
were punished by Novotny last summer were fully 
exonerated. Those expelled from the party re-
gained their memberships and no longer are excluded 
from work in their fields. An informal agreement 
lifting censorship was arrived at between the 
party and news media editors. Until the National 
Assembly can act, the unpopular "press law" is 
still on the books, and the -action program calls 
for retention of a qualified ex post facto censor-
ship, similar to the "gentlemen's agreement" now 
in force. 
11. Dubcek and the reformers, probably be-
cause they approved, have not interfered in recent 
months . as various national or special interest 
groups purged themselves of leaders tainted ~y 
their past associations with Novotny or earl7e~ 
regimes. University students bolted the official 
youth organization, setting up one of their own. 
Trade unions, professional organizations,.farm~r~ 
groups, and government bodies even including mili-
tary units openly and successfully pressed con-
servative leaders to resign. New groups re~resent­






mushrooms. Their continued existence seems assured 
by the action program. 
12. Perhaps the best sununary of what has 
happened since Dubcek took over was given in early 
April by a horrified consGrvative party central 
committee member: 
Honest functionaries are going through 
personal tragedies, factory managers are 
being dismissed, demands are being voiced 
to return to pre-1948 conditions, claims 
are being heard that enterprises with up to 
50 employees should be returned to private 
ownership, numerous policemen are joining 
the (Catholic) People's Party, editors of 
youth newspapers are becoming members of the 
Socialist Party and, to me the most shocking 
of all, a West German bourgeois ~ournalist 
was permitted to attend a Communist Party 
conference. 
A bloodthirsty vendetta has been un-
leashed and skullhunters are shooting down 
functionaries, the youth union has disinte-
grated, editorial boards of newspapers are 
emancipating themselves, judges are hanging 
themselves, the countryside is being swept 
by the slog an "nation al conuni ttees without 
Communists," and there are new problems con-
nected with the elections. 
Perhaps there is not yet any reason 
for panic and pessimism. Perhaps, as another 
speaker has declared, a cold shiver need not 
yet go down our spines. But I nevertheless 
see the situation as serious indeed. 
The "bloodthirsty vendetta" and the "shooting 
down 11 of functionaries are figures of speech so far 
as is known. There is no evidence that anyone has 
been hurt or arrested although there have been 
spectacular suicides. There are some indications, 
however, that those who perpetrated the bloody 






The Second Stage of Revolution 
13. The Dubcek regime is not out of the 
woods yet. Conservatives in the party central 
committee and in regional and local organizations 
~re fightin? a s~rong rear-guard action, attempt-
ing to retain as much as possible of the status 
quo. They also are still in power in government 
ministries and in many cases in the local national 
councils. To a degree, these functionaries can 
a~d probably will attempt to sabotage implementa-
tion of reform measures. Over 100 hard-core con-
servatives still hold a third of the National 
Assembly's votes. 
14. Much to the disappointment of progres-
sives, the conservative forces were able to delete 
from the party action program a call for convoca-
tion of a party congress before its scheduled 
date in 1970. Only the congress is empowered to 
make changes in the composition of the central 
conunittee. The progressives fear that holdovers 
from the Novotny regime will use the time between 
now and the congress to pull down the Dubcek re-
gime, or at least to create such chaos that reform 
would have to be abandoned. The issue of the 
congress has become a public controversy and 
Dubcek has been severely criticized for refusing 
to take an unequivocal stand on it. 
15. Such remarks as Dubcek has made, how-
ever, indicate that he favors convocation of a 
congress sometime next spring, after he has had a 
chance to evaluate the activities of central com-
mittee members against the background of their 
performance vis-a-vis the action program. Dubcek 
has said that he will not be a party to wholesale 
purges of the Communist Party membership, .·and he 
squelched proposals raised at a l to 5 April 
central conunittee meeting for reconvening local 









16. Dubcek and the reformers probably would 
have far fewer conservatives to contend with at 
lower levels of the party if in January they had 
not foolishly bowed to conservative demands to 
keep the background of Novotny's ouster a secret. 
Local party election meetings were held in Febru-
ary under conditions of unprecedented confusion, 
and the party rank-and-file voted on the basis of 
an interpretation of events in Prague given to 
them by their old leaders. As a result, conserva-
tives were frequently re-elected. 
17. Dubcek realized his mistake too late, 
and the delegates to regional party conferences 
which began on 20 April were elected from among 
the recently returned conservatives. In most 
cases, reformers can be expected to press for the 
ouster of old regional leaders, and there are 
signs that regional press campaigns, similar to 
the massive effort which culminated in Novotny's 
resignation from the presidency, are under way. 
Should these efforts fail, Dubcek's task in con-
vening a party congress will be all the harder, 
for the regional party organizations can greatly 
influence the selection of congress delegates. 
Furthermore, retention of a regional leadership 
by conservatives probably would mean great diffi-
culties for the action program in that particular 
region. 
18. Dubcek's prospects of gaining control of 
the government apparatus are somewhat better. 
Local elections throughout the country have been 
postponed from May to next fall at the earliest so 
that the National Front, with its newly revitalized 
minor political parties and public bodies such as 
trade unions, can prepare new lists of candidates 
to replace the ones which apparently had already 
been drawn up under the Novotny regime. The forth-
coming new electoral law probably will provide 
that henceforth a candidate who receives a majority 
of the votes cast will be elected, a routine pro-






19. Elections to the National Assembly are 
scheduled for November. If through these elections 
Dubcek can put in reformist. majorities on local 
and national levels, he may be able selectively 
to circumvent recalcitrant· party organizations and 
deal with the government directly. Dubcek prob-
ably would consider such a course as a last resort, 
and temporary at best, but there is no reason to 
doubt that he would do it, especially if he was 
faced with failure of . his program and loss of 
power. 
20. Dubcek is relying for· success on the con-
tinued support of the free press, and of special 
interest groups such as students, intellectuals, 
farmers, and members of national minorities, as 
well as the population in general. He has shown 
a keen awareness of the problems facing the ordinary 
man and has promised to give first priority to the 
greatest of these, housing. The Czechoslovak Govern-
ment is prepared to invite foreign--meaning Western--
firms into the country to alleviate the drastic 
housing shortage as rapidly as possible, according 
to the new minister of construction . . 
21. Conservatives have been spreading rumors 
that forthright implementation of the economic re-
form will lead to a sharp drop in the average man's 
standard of living. Dubcek and other leaders have 
been stressing that they will not allow this to 
happen. Even so, many workers will suffer temporary 
unemployment and face the prospect of relocation. 
These effects of the reform will be unpopular and 
will have to be phased carefully or Dubcek will 
lose what worker support he has. In his maiden 
speech as chairman of the National Assembly, Josef 
Smrkovsky stressed protection of the worker, urging 
adoption of legal guarantees of minimum wages and 
of pensions. In the past, the regime manip~lated 
wages and pensions to exact political compliance or 








Russian Reactions and East European Fears 
t e Russians, who 
argely depended on Novotny and his coterie for 
information, underestimated the potential strength 
of the wave of demands for liberalization unleashed 
by Di.~.bcek during the leadership crisis from Gctober 
1967 to January 1968. After Novotny's ouster, when 
they began to understand it more clearly, they were 
concerned, lest it take an anti-
Russian or an anti-Communist turn. Dubcek has re-
assured them on these 'points many times, in private 
and in public, and the Soviet leaders appear to 
have accepted them. 
23. The ~ussians are nevertheless uneasy over 
the prospect that Dubcek may not be able to control 
the course of democratization in Czechoslovakia. 
They and the other Eastern Europeans, especially 
the Poles and the East Germans, are also worried 
that ~zechoslovak ideas on democratization will 
spread to and arouse their populations. The meet-
ing on 23-24 March in Dresden of Russian and East-
ern European leaders (minus Rumania) was called 
primarily to discuss Czechoslovakia in these terms, 
as well as the impact of recent events in Eastern 
Europe on CEMA and the Warsaw Pact. 
24. 
Dubcek came in for considerable criticism 
tne Dresden meeting but nevertheless gained 
grudging acceptance for his program and ideas. 
Polish leader Gomulka, who had just suppressed anti-
regime student riots fed by developments in Czecho-
slovakia, was reported to have charged that the 
Czechoslovak party had lost control and was facing 
an almost counterrevolutionary situation led by 
intellectuals and rightists. He fearfully added 
that if such a "false liberalization" succeeded, 
it would have grave repercussions in Poland. 
Hungary's Kadar seconded Gomulka's remarks and 
said that the 1956 revolution in Hungary "began 
in the same way." Brezhnev was also critical, but 
wrapped up the meeting by accepting Dubcek's ~x­
planations. He warned, however, that the Sovi7ts 













25. Developments _since the Dresden meeting 
indicate that the Russians and the Eastern Europeans 
were dissatisfied with ·the results of the conference 
and remained concerned about Czechoslovakia's 
course. East German spokesmen sharply attacked 
the Czechoslovaks for playing into the hands of 
the "imperialist" West and he~ped bitter condemna-
tions on the extreme liberal Josef Smrkovsky, who 
was then a leading presidential candidate. The 
East Germans and the Poles have virtually sealed 
their Czechoslovak borders. Hungary has issued 
a number of public warnings, referring to its own 
blood bath in 1956, to remind the Czechoslovaks 
to be careful. The recent plenum of the Soviet 
party central committee apparently adopted measures 
designed to ensure that the Prague plague did not 
spread to the USSR. Soviet newspaper articles 
have included a number of implicit warnings to 
the Czechoslovaks not to allow the Communist Partv· 
to lose control, and implicit threats of econo~ic- · 
pressures ~ased on Czechoslovakia's economic 
dependence on the USSR. 
26. It seems clear that in the new circum-
stances in Prague, Soviet influence on the work-
ings of the Czechoslovak Part and Government has 
diminished. by rnid-
February the Russian officials were reduced to 
asking for information from their Czechoslovak 
counterparts. _ _ believes that ~he Russians 
will tolerate a variety of changes in Czecho-
slovakia, so long as Communists continue to rule 
and the new regime honors its alliances ··wi th the 
USSR and the Eastern European states and its com-
mitments to the international Communist movement. 
Dubcek repeatedly has said he intends to observe 
these limits but his regime's interpretation of 
such limitations differs markedly from that of 
the Russians and others. On 19 April Rude Pravo, 
the main party daily, underscored this by defend-
ing Czechoslovakia's "socialist model," and by 
stating "no one can prescribe for any party what 







27. Dubcek has said that he intends to take 
up the questions of the leadership structure of 
the Warsaw Pact and the concepts underlying the 
pact's existence. Economists in czechbslovakia 
are beginning to urge publicly that defense spend-
ing be cut and the money saved used for economic 
purposes. The new minister cf foreign trade has 
attacked the economic usefulnes6 of CE.MA and has 
indicated that Prague wants to loosen its ties 
with this closed system and to .reorient its trade 
to ~ wo.:z:;Ldwide basis.. The new ·government is also 
examining the .problems involved in making the 
Czechoslovak crown a convertible currency. 
Where the Czechoslovaks Go From Here 
28. The Russians and the other unhappy East 
European leaders apparently believe that Dubcek 
can hold Czechoslovakia back from what they see 
as an anti-Conununist abyss. At first glance, it 
wouli · appear to be so. There have been no basic 
institutional changes in Czechoslovakia yet and 
the new leadership includes many who used to be 
known as conservatives. The population is hopeful, 
but is skeptical, and is still waiting for legis-
lation implementing the promises. The action pro-
gram could be no more than empty promises. 
29. Such an analysis, however, ignores the 
style characteristic of the Dubcek regime, with 
its emphasis on due process and on participation 
of people of all shades of opinion in making 
decisions. The new appointments to key positions 
in both party and government reflect this, with 
conservatives such as Kelder retained and ultra-
liberals such as Husak, who has called for insti-
tution of a multiparty system, being added. The 
· action program calls for .extensive institutional 
changes and there are no signs that the r7g~me 
will renege. Pressures from Czechoslovakia s 
Communist neighbors have had their effect, but 
not on Czechoslovakia's basic course, only on 
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30. There is no way for the Dubcek regime to 
retract its pr{)mises without reverting to a ter-
roristic polic~ state system. The regime may 
drag its feet, refusing to accede to pressures for 
a multiparty system or for a restoration of full 
freedom for the churches, but it has promised too 
much ever to pull back completely without facing 
the prospect of revolution. There is no way for 
the Russians ·and the other Conununist states to 
force political changes without resorting to 
economic boycotts or armed intervention. Czecho-
slovakia's economy is so intricately interwoven 
with those of the USSR and other Eastern European 
states that Dubcek's inexorable progress toward 
Communist "democratization" will, initially at 
least, be gradual and cautious. 
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